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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the compatibility of sociological and cultural interpretations of 
the phenomena of civil-military relations in the Euro-Atlantic realm within the 
contemporary challenges of European Security Defense Policy (ESDP). This study 
further describes and analyzes the key features of the German approach of “Innere 
Fuehrung” with its guiding principle of the “citizen in uniform”—a central ideal with a 
long European tradition. The thesis argues that conceptual deficiencies and 
terminological imprecision in the field of civil-military relations within the European 
Union, in general, and ESDP, in particular, could lead to problematic consequences for 
European military integration in the future. If these deficiencies are not addressed by 
those affected by them, such problems of democratic civil military affairs in the leading 
European nations could have a significant impact on the evolution and future shape of 
civil-military relations in the European Union, in general, and on the role and status of 
European soldiers, in particular, amid the challenges and threats of the present and future. 
This thesis answers the question of how well suited the German civil-military concept 
and philosophy of Innere Fuehrung can be to the enhancement of EU military integration. 
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A. PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE 
Almost 12 years after the December 1998 British-French St. Malo initiative on 
European Defense, and after eleven years of rapidly developing European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP)1 activities, one can suggest that, through various ESDP missions 
and operations,2 combat at the tactical or operational level in security building alone is 
not sufficient to achieve the political goals of peace, stability, and democratic 
transformation in the zones of contention and instability in Eurasia and beyond. In 
today’s scenarios, European Union (EU) soldiers have to be able to function effectively 
in a complex interagency environment with a variety of civilian actors in the field of 
operations. These developments have equally significant consequences for political and 
military roles, hence for civil-military relations as a whole.3 Besides enormous 
transformational efforts concerning military structures, military activity is, in general, 
taking place at the international level. 
Although the EU is the only international organization with the full spectrum of 
civil and military operational resources, its success in complex scenarios depends on 
combining these civil and military forces to cope with the security and defense challenges 
of the twenty-first century. Thus, not only has the level of integration of EU missions 
                                                 
1 With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, ESDP has become “CSDP” 
(Common Security and Defence Policy). Since this paper investigates its theme by examining the past, the 
term CSDP will only be used in conjunction with very recent and future developments and those related to 
the Treaty of Lisbon, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/cg00014.en07.pdf (accessed 
January 30, 2009). 
2 A total of 24 EU missions and operations (ongoing and completed) at the time this thesis was 
written. See Volker Heise, 10 Jahre Europaeische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik, SWP-Studie, 
http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=6396 (accessed November 28, 2009), 26. 
3 Peter Volten and Margriet Drent, “Civil Direction of the Military: Redefining the Balance in France, 
Germany, Romania and the United Kingdom,” in Common Norms and Good Practices of Civil-Military 
Relations in the EU, eds. Anne Aldis and Margriet Drent (The Netherlands: Centre for European Security 
Studies [CESS], 2008), 18. 
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changed,4 but also the political and strategic role of the soldier in ESDP operations, 
characterized by relatively little violence but by significant political effect. 
Civil-military relations have become more important in all security-related areas 
in the strategic and tactical realms. Within this scope, the cooperation among EU soldiers 
will have to increase significantly, especially in the light of “a common defence policy 
that might lead to a common defence,”5 as indicated by the ratified Treaty of Lisbon and 
as expressed in the former President of the European Parliament’s vision of a European 
Army.6 Thus, the different military cultures, traditions and institutions of contributing 
European Union nations will be challenged with, for example, the harmonization of 
currently varying rights of soldiers originating from different political and social 
traditions of state and society. Challenges will also include legal and policy aspects that 
reach far beyond technical synchronization and tactical or operational interoperability as 
seen in terms of weapons and defense management in a politically neutral sense. Hardly 
any progress has been made in this field of the collective inner structure of European 
armies over the past 10 years. National caveats have proven to constrain operational 
effectiveness, at least in the eyes of some critics.7 But, such caveats are to a lesser or 
                                                 
4 The first missions called “civil-military” by the EU were the supporting missions to the United 
Nations in Sudan and the peace monitoring mission in Aceh (Aceh Monitoring Mission, AMM). 
5 Treaty of Lisbon, 33. See, i.e., Jolyon Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union. 
The European Union Series (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 315; Michael Eliot Howard, War in 
European History (London; New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 165. 
6 Hans-Gert Poettering, former President of the European Parliament, “New Developments and 
Approaches to a Defence Europe” (Speech at Congress on European Security and Defence, Berlin, 
November 10, 2008), http://www.daten.euro-defence.eu/2008/poettering_e.pdf (accessed August 1, 2009). 
Besides the intent to come up with a comprehensive approach to security within the EU, the economic 
viability of national defense budgets can be put into question. In times of the present financial crisis, 
budgetary pressure on national defense budgets demands new approaches and is likely to further foster 
these thoughts. In Germany, for example, announcements of Federal Minister of Defence, Karl-Theodor zu 
Guttenberg (Christian Social Party [CSU]) to drastically cut defense spending in light of the overall 
budgetary needs and, with that, the put to test of the conscription system, triggered a vigorous political 
debate with aftermaths that affect the governmental stability. Compare Oliver Hoischen et al, “Kabale und 
Hiebe: Wie ein Wunschbuendnis zerfaellt,” Frankfurter Allgemeine faz.net, 
http://www.faz.net/s/Rub594835B672714A1DB1A121534F010EE1/Doc~EFC78DCF315BF4620AD7B33
D4FE93D11C~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html (accessed June 13, 2010). 
7 Compare, i.e., Poettering, New Developments and Approaches to a Defence Europe; further see 
Johannes Varwick, “Auf dem Weg zur “Euroarmee.” Internationale Politik, January 2007, 49, 
http://www.politik.uni-kiel.de/publikationen/varwick/IP-1_Varwick.pdf (accessed June 11, 2010); 
additionally Berthold Meyer, The Concept of “Innere Fuehrung” and its Translation into the Agenda of 
Socialisation of German Soldiers. German Case. PRIF-Research Paper No. II/3-2008, 36. 
 3
greater degree (a) a mirror of domestic politics as well and their effect on military 
institutions and (b) indicative of the unchanging truths of military burden-sharing that are 
surely nothing new in European security and defense. The permanent need for 
compromises (which are the bedrock of modern European statecraft for peace, prosperity, 
and security) imposes pressure not only on military leaders but also on political decision-
makers. Such compromises have been limited to purely operational rules of engagement 
thus far, but they will increasingly have an impact on the ongoing political and social 
process that is a central part of the integration of European Union soldiers into the EU’s 
civil society. 
The civil-military concept and philosophy of “Innere Fuehrung,”8 first drafted in 
1953 and implemented in conjunction with the build-up after the Second World War of 
new West German armed forces has enabled the “Bundeswehr,” the German armed 
forces to integrate into state and society, especially after the reunification of Germany in 
1990.9 Innere Fuehrung formed the basis for the swift and relatively easy manner in 
which the soldiers of the East German armed forces, the “Nationale Volksarmee,” were 
transformed from a potentially dangerous force into a unified German army. Innere 
Fuehrung remains the cornerstone of German civil-military relations. Twenty years after 
the reunification of Germany it has also proven its value for the successful integration of 
former citizens of a totalitarian state into the armed forces of a democracy. 
This thesis investigates how compatible the sociological and cultural approaches 
to explaining the phenomena of civil-military relations in the Euro-Atlantic realm are 
with the particular challenges within the framework of European Security Defense 
Policy. The author is familiar with these issues through service in the headquarters of 
such European institutions and agencies as well as his own professional commitment to 
Innere Fuehrung as the basis of professional excellence. The present work further 
                                                 
8 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (Federal Ministry of Defence), Zentrale Dienstvorschrift (Joint 
Service Regulation) ZDv 10/1. Innere Fuehrung (Leadership Development and Civic Education) (January 
28, 2008). This term does not make full sense in its customary English translations. It can be best 
interpreted as the concept and philosophy of “Leadership Development and Civic Education.” 
9 Abenheim´s scholarship on this topic is of note. See, i.e., Donald Abenheim, Image of the 
Wehrmacht in Federal German Society and in the Tradition of the Bundeswehr. Occasional Paper #3 
(Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Civil-Military Relations, Monterey 1999). 
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analyzes the key features of the German approach of Innere Fuehrung with its guiding 
principle of the “citizen in uniform”—a central ideal with a long European tradition. With 
a view to common ESDP operations, the principles and practices of Innere Fuehrung will 
be discussed10 to explore the potential value of Innere Fuehrung as a starting point for 
reflection about the evolution of civil-military relations within the EU in general and as 
an impetus for a broad discussion about the enhancement of European armed forces in 
particular.11 
The major research question of this thesis is: what role has the perception of civil-
military relations played within the framework of European Security and Defence Policy 
in the development of agreed-upon European Union concepts and in the transformation 
of integrated European Union military structures, and how well suited is the German 
civil-military concept and philosophy of Innere Fuehrung to enhancing EU military 
integration? 
The study addresses two aspects: First, the author suggests that the absence of a 
comprehensive approach towards civil-military relations in the EU has a negative impact 
on the Union in general and on ESDP in particular. This study further argues that the 
German civil-military concept and philosophy of Innere Fuehrung is well suited to the 
needs of Europe as a whole, showing that this concept of leadership, command and 
morale has performed well in the integration of soldiers and democracy in the 1950s and 
the 1990s for both the Federal Republic and Central Europe and the evolving requirement 
to formulate a code of the military professional within the framework of the modern 
democratic nation state and now union of European democracies. 
B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
International security challenges cause the expansion of necessary skills, both for 
the civil and the military professional, especially in diplomatic and intercultural skills and 
expertise. This development calls for a fundamentally different system of interconnected 
                                                 
10 Compare, i.e., Uwe Hartmann, Innere Fuehrung. Erfolge und Defizite der Fuehrungsphilosophie 
fuer die Bundeswehr (Eschede: Hartmann Miles-Verlag, 2007). 
11 Compare, i.e., Uwe Hartmann, Claus von Rosen, Christian Walther (eds.), Jahrbuch Innere 
Fuehrung 2009. Die Rueckkehr des Soldatischen (Eschede: Hartmann Miles-Verlag, 2009). 
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civil, military, and civil-military training, education, career paths, promotion, and status 
rights. Overall, this requirement reflects the evolution and internalization of strategic and 
civil-military cultures, both at the domestic and at the EU levels.12 It is, in fact, the 
political cause for a newly required guidance for military professionalism and for a 
review of the balance between democratic civilian control and military professionalism 
on all levels of operations and military service.13 Within the framework of ESDP (CSDP 
since December 2009), the guiding hypothesis in this regard is that, although national 
military autonomy is likely to become less important, national military cultures14 will 
continue into the transformation phase. 
One can rightly assert that there exists the problematique that nationally assured 
rights and constitutional and social values could be partially sacrificed within the 
multinational environment of an ESDP/CSDP operation in favor of tactical and 
operational determinism that overemphasizes combat in the traditional sense and/or 
which tramples on necessary civil military practices of great merit. Evidence indicates 
that this problem has not been noted comprehensively on the political level.15 That is, if 
one recalls the history of the European Defense Community in the early 1950s, the 






                                                 
12 Compare Volten and Drent, Civil Direction of the Military, 19. 
13 Ibid., 20. 
14 Fundamental differences among EU member states’ national leadership principles and national 
strategic cultures are still prominent, looking, i.e., at the fact that Germany still holds on to conscription 
while Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, and The Netherlands have transformed their armies into fully 
professional armed forces. 
15 Compare, i.e., Bernhard Gertz, Vice-President of EUROMIL (European Organisation of Military 
Associations), “Europaeischer Staatsbuerger in Uniform: Anspruch und Realitaet” (Speech at 3rd 
Petersberger Talks. Petersberg (Bonn), March 10, 2007), 
http://www.ulrikemerten.de/media/file/58.Oberst_B._Gertz-_Europ._Buerger_in_Uniform-
_Anspruch_und_Realitaet.pdf (accessed September 12, 2009). 
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opposition from especially France, whose tradition of republican soldier in Catholic 
Europe diverged from the Protestant, northern European reform essentials of Innere 
Fuehrung.16 
Different concepts of and approaches to civil-military relations have emerged 
among scholars, international organizations, and governments in the Euro Atlantic realm 
but also within the leading nations of the EU and its predecessors. But neither a common 
language nor the very definition of civil-military relations has been agreed upon yet, 
leading to a diversified understanding.17 The cultural and sociological aspects of civil-
military relations in the context of this thesis refer to the relationship between the military 
and society. The term democratic “civil-military relations” in this thesis is understood as 
the dynamic process of interaction between armed forces and their parent civilian society, 
more concretely, between the EU’s armed forces and the EU’s society at large. This 
interaction encompasses the changes in content as well as in form of military activity for 
the time period observed and includes aspects of social integration, such as recruitment 
and resettlement, military education, and military aid to the civil community.18 
One argument of this thesis is that the European trend to end conscription and the 
denigration of the “citizen-soldier” could weaken democratic attitudes within EU armed 
forces and that the perceptions within the European Union regarding security aspects will 
increasingly differ between the civil society and the professional armed forces. If one 
                                                 
16 On this subject, see Donald Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross. The Search for Tradition in the 
West German Armed Forces (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). Further see Donald Abenheim, 
Soldiers and Politics Transformed: German-American Reflections on Civil-Military Relations in a New 
Strategic Environment (Berlin: Miles-Verlag, 2007); Hartmann et al, Jahrbuch Innere Fuehrung 2009. 
Further see Hartmann, Innere Fuehrung. Also see the new and definitive work of Frank Naegler, Der 
Gewollte Soldat und Sein Wandel. Personelle Rüstung und Innere Führung in den Aufbaujahren der 
Bundeswehr 1956 bis 1964/65 (München: Oldenbourg 2010). 
17 For a comprehensive overview over those aspects of civil-military relations that are not object of 
this study, compare this author, Zivil-Militaerische Beziehungen im Rahmen der ESVP; Begriffe, 
Sachstaende, Herausforderungen. SWP Diskussionspapier, Berlin, August 2006, http://www.swp-
berlin.org/de/common/get_document.php?asset_id=3192&PHPSESSID=6cd7629ad01aaa225a97d981e624
b50d (accessed July 26, 2009); or Carmen Gebhard, Zivil-Militaerische Koordinierung und 
Zusammenarbeit. CMCO vs. CIMIC. Abgrenzung der Begriffe. Info Aktuell 01/07. 
Landesverteidigungsakademie. Institut fuer Friedenssicherung und Konfliktmanagement, Wien, Mai 2007. 
18 Compare Marina Nuciari, “Models and Explanations for Military Organization: An Updated 
Reconsideration,” in Handbook of the Sociology of the Military, ed. Guiseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer 
Academic/ Plenum Publishers, 2003), 69. 
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follows this argument, then the basics of “Europeanized” civilian control of the military 
and civil-military relations within the EU in general deserve more attention.19 
Hitherto, there has not been, nor has there been an effort to prepare, a 
comprehensive EU concept at the political level with definitions of key terms and 
fundamental principles for democratic civil-military relations. 
One finding of this thesis is that, at the strategic and conceptual level, cultural 
intersections that would have to be addressed in the context of a comprehensive civil-
military approach, have been mostly neglected within the framework of ESDP. 
Looking furthermore at the degree to which democratic norms within EU member 
states´ militaries are distinctive at the domestic level, one has to note significant 
differences in practice, heritage and political effect in service. This generalization applies, 
for example, to central areas like the restriction of basic rights, freedom of association, 
degree of participation, or the basic principle of leadership, command, discipline, morale,  
military order and soldierly obedience. Those differences are also expressed through the 
respective military cultures of the EU, which, when compared one to another, reveal 
unequal statutory bases and states of democratization.20 
With a view to the enhancement of a common strategic culture21 within the EU in 
general, and in the light of the importance of common norms and perceptions in the 
framework of ESDP/CSDP, however, this holistic approach should be undertaken in light 
of the record of the EDC in the early 1950s and the requirements of the present in the 
face of operations. Even if there were opinions that favor “pragmatism and realism” over 
                                                 
19 Compare Caforio, Sociology, 438. 
20 Ibid. 
21 See Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 18, 48, 178–206, 252; Christoph 
O. Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture. Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the 
European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 20; Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, “The 
Strategic Culture of the European Union: A Progress Report.” International Affairs 81, no. 4 (2005): 801–
820; Alistair Ian Johnston, “Strategic Culture Revisited: A Reply to Colin Gray,” Review of International 
Studies 25, no. 3 (1999): 519–23; Alistair Ian Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” International 
Security 19, no. 4 (1995): 32–64; Sten Rynning, “The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?” 
Security Dialogue 34, no. 4 (2003): 479–496. 
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“developing civil-military concepts,”22 the methodological and sociological importance 
of an underlying strategic framework should not be disregarded totally. 
This thesis is based on the assumption that there is ambiguity in theory and 
practice regarding key terms in the field of civil-military relations within the framework 
of the EU, with substantially different connotations among EU member states. This 
ambiguity has not been addressed comprehensively by scholars so far; it will have to be 
addressed for the ends of effective policy and the further construction of Europe and its 
army of the future. 
The study argues that this ambiguity will affect the individual level as well, that 
is, the general status of the European soldier, during EU operations as well as in 
peacetime outside of operations. This status will determine the future face of civil-
military relations within the EU with a qualitative impact upon the democratic face of the 
EU in general. The discussion on a general common legal and social system for European 
soldiers in the long term has already started.23 
This study furthermore answers the question of how well suited the German civil-
military concept and philosophy of Innere Fuehrung is to enhancing EU military 
integration. 
The main argument of the thesis is that conceptual deficiencies and terminological 
imprecision in the field of civil-military relations within the EU, in general, and ESDP, in 
particular, could lead to problematic consequences for European military integration in 
the future. It is further argued that, if these deficiencies are not addressed, they could 
have a significant impact on the evolution and future shape of civil-military relations in 
the EU, in general, and on the role and status of European soldiers, in particular, amid the 
challenges and threats of the present and future. 
                                                 
22 Eva Gross, EU and the Comprehensive Approach, Danish Institute for International Studies. DIIS 
Report 2008, November 2008, 13. 
23 Compare, i.e., Gertz, Europaeischer Staatsbuerger in Uniform: Anspruch und Realitaet. 
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C. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION 
According to the aspects of this study, the thesis’ investigation after this 
introduction (Chapter I) is organized as follows: 
Chapter II analyzes the perception of civil-military relations since the beginning 
of ESDP in 1999. In connection, it analyzes how those perceptions affected the 
developments of concepts regarding the transformation of the integrated EU’s civil-
military structures, thereby exposing conceptual deficiencies. In particular, this chapter 
investigates the cultural and sociological aspects of civil-military relations in reference to 
the relationship between the military and society among EU member states. It 
encompasses aspects of social integration, such as recruitment and resettlement, 
embedding of military education, and military aid towards the civil community. The 
investigation covers briefly how those cultural intersections are developed differently 
among EU member states’ militaries. This will answer the first part of the major research 
question of this thesis. 
Chapter III, in historical narrative form, elaborates upon the conceptual genesis 
of the German concept of Innere Fuehrung and identifies its key features, principles and 
practices. This chapter finally analyzes the domestic debate about Innere Fuehrung in the 
context of out-of-area operations of the Bundeswehr in general, and with a view to 
unique features of Innere Fuehrung within the realm of ESDP/ CSDP, in particular, such 
as aspects of social integration and legal status, recruitment and resettlement, and military 
education. 
Chapter IV concludes my study by discussing how the key features of Innere 
Fuehrung could be applied to the constructive evolution of civil-military relations within 
the EU. This will answer the second part of this thesis’ major research question. 
Summing up, this thesis addresses two main themes. First, it investigates the 
extent to which the absence of a common definition of civil-military relations has a 




Fuehrung is well suited to the situation at hand because it has performed the integration 
functions now called for in the European Union well in the context of Germany’s own 
history. 
By deducing a consistent and comprehensive understanding of democratic civil-
military relations based on an identification of all the related functional areas and by 
linking this frame of reference to the well-established German concept of Innere 
Fuehrung (single case), this thesis bridges the existing gaps in scholarship and policy. It 
merges findings from existing bodies of scholarly literature, which pays too little heed to 
the German case and its possible multinational importance in the context of the EU and 
NATO in the twenty-first century. Looking at the broad topic of democratic civil-military 
relations from a different angle may give an impetus to a reorientation of ideas and 
analytical frameworks in order to find out what might be problematic.24 This may 
contribute to the solution of practical problems. At the very least, this thesis can provoke 
debate on the subject. The respective normative assessment, namely, the opinion of the 
author, will be clearly expressed and marked as such in the thesis at the respective 
positions and again contrasted to major opposing arguments25 in the conclusion. 
                                                 
24 Respective initial thoughts on this methodology were further encouraged by reading Theda 
Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), xi–43. 
25 Such arguments have been rare because of the mostly outstanding approaches to the subject having 
emerged only for a short time; see, i.e., Eric Chauvistre, Wir Gutkrieger. Warum die Bundeswehr im 
Ausland scheitern wird (Frankfurt; New York: Campus Verlag, 2009), Jürgen Kuhlmann and Jean 
Callaghan. “About the Primacy of Politics over Military Matters: (West) Germany’s Approach to 
Integrating the Bundeswehr into its Democracy,” in Renaissance of Democratic Control of Armed Forces 
in Contemporary Societies, (eds.) Hans Born, Karl Haltiner, and Marjan Malešič. Arbeitskreis Militaer und 
Sozialwissenschaften Band 36 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2004), 77–101. 
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II. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 
Once you have educated, orderly, upstanding, and free citizens, you will 
have disciplined and obedient soldiers.26 
Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859) 
A. FOUR WAVES OF LITERATURE ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
In order to investigate specific ESDP-related questions concerning civil-military 
relations, it is necessary first to have a broader fundamental orientation about civil-
military relations in general. Scholarly work on civil-military relations has evolved in 
four waves of study since the Second World War, linked to different functional 
approaches to the subject.  
In the late 1950s, authors, especially in the U.S. in light of the Korean War, gave 
in-depth attention to what can in broad terms be called the relations between the soldier 
and the state. In this first wave of study, Samuel P. Huntington, Michael Eliot Howard, 
Morris Janowitz, and Samuel E. Finer, the prominent scholars of this first period,27 
developed major theories28 from their empirical observations of Western democracies. 
Huntington’s main argument was that “military professionalism,” especially within the 
officer corps on the model of U.S. military custom in the 19th until mid 20th centuries, is 
the decisive concept to keep the military out of politics. This functional approach is 
                                                 
26 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (J. P. Mayer (ed.), New York: Harper and Row, 
1966), 650–651. 
27 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957); Michael Eliot Howard, 
Soldiers and Governments (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1959); Morris Janowitz, The 
Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, III.: Free Press, 1960): Samuel E. Finer, 
The Man On Horseback. The Role of the Military in Politics, 2nd, enlarged, rev. and updated ed. (Boulder, 
Colo; London, England: Westview Press; F. Pinter, 1988). For a more comprehensive overview compare 
Hew Strachan, The Politics of the British Army (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 8–19. 
28 Compare for a thorough discussion, i.e., Peter D.Feaver, “The civil-military problematique: 
Huntington, Janowitz, and the question of civilian control,” Armed Forces & Society 23, no. 2 (1996): 149–
178. 
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linked to technical expertise and military “secondary” virtues, such as discipline, 
accuracy, “military craft,” and a high degree of responsibility to the public and its 
citizens.29 This professionalism, he argued, will make the officer corps focus its loyalty 
on the military ideal. Motivated by this loyalty, such a politically neutral military would 
ultimately accept the civilian authority as the legitimate superior of the state and carry out 
its orders without a risk of military intervention.30 Janowitz did not agree with this logic, 
concluding in a more sociological approach that transformation in technology and 
society, as well as in missions, had led to an even greater political role of the military. For 
him, this role, however, was far from involvement like a coup d’état, at least in the U.S., 
due to the apolitical ethic of the military profession.31 Finer countered Huntington’s main 
argument by his observations of the highly professional and technically competent 
German and Japanese armies’ interventions in the politics of their states. He prevents any 
attempt to devalue those armies as being not fully professional or as being armies of non-
democracies by challenging Huntington’s concept of professionalism in toto.32 Karsten 
expands Finer’s criticism by noting that “the military will always have some political role 
in even the most mature competitive democracy.”33 This is to be seen as an answer to 
Huntington’s34 enhanced argument that democratization has led to improved civil-
military relations and limited involvement of armed forces in politics. 
The second wave of study ranges from 1963 to 1979 and can be related mainly to 
the development of economic and political theory. Given the important political changes 
                                                 
29 Compare Peter Karsten, “The Coup d’État and Civilian Control of the Military in Competitive 
Democracies,” in To Sheathe the Sword. Civil-military Relations in the Quest for Democracy, eds. John P. 
Lovell and David E. Albright (Westport, London: Greenwood Press, 1997), 160. According to its scope, his 
study will not investigate coup d’états. 
30 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 74, 84–88, 534. 
31 Janowitz, The Professional Soldier. 
32 Finer, The Man On Horseback, 25. 
33 Karsten, Coup d’État, 152. 
34 Samuel P. Huntington, “Reforming Civil-Military Relations,” in Civil-Military Relations and 
Democracy, eds. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 
3–11. 
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in Spain and Portugal in the 1970s, as well as in Latin America,35 and developments in 
Asia and Africa, all closely connected to strong military involvement, the studies in this 
period focused on theories to explain policy outcomes and the likeliness of coups 
d’état.36 The research of this likeliness gained momentum through the developments in 
Turkey (1960), France (1961), and Greece (1967).37 Polar to the more empirical approach 
during the first wave, scholars like van Doorn38 developed a highly theoretical 
framework for civil-military relations and democratic control of armed forces in general, 
but also in the light of the Vietnam War and the end of military conscription in the United 
States.39 After 10 years of inconspicuous research and as a consequence of the political 
events in Eastern Europe and Germany, the focus shifted again. 
The third wave40 of democratization, beginning in 1989 drew the attention in the 
field of civil-military relations research to the modernization challenges faced by 
countries of post-communist Europe, then transforming into democracies and reforming 
their armed forces and security sectors.41 For over a decade, NATO and its Partnership 
                                                 
35 For a deeper analysis including the development of modernization theory, see Juan J. Linz and 
Alfred C. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South 
America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). 
36 Compare, i.e., Steffen W. Schmidt and Gerald A. Dorfman (eds.), Soldiers in Politics (Los Altos, 
CA,: Geron-X, 1974). Furthermore see David Collier, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and Joint Committee 
on Latin American Studies, The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press, 1979). 
37 The subject of coups d’états will not be further explored in this thesis. As a comprehensive analysis 
one can compare Kurt Lang, “The Military Putsch in a Developed Political Culture,” in Armed Forces and 
Society. Sociological Essays, ed. Jacques van Doorn (The Hague; Paris: Mouton and Co, 1968), 202–228. 
38 Compare, i.e., van Doorn, Armed Forces and Society. A later work on the subject is Jacques van 
Doorn (ed.), The Soldier and Social Change (Beverly Hills; London: Sage Publications, 1975). 
39 Claude Emerson Welch and Arthur K. Smith, Military Role and Rule: Perspectives on Civil-
Military Relations (North Scituate, Mass: Duxbury Press, 1974); and Andrew Jackson Goodpaster et al, 
Civil-Military Relations (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977). 
40 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 366. 
41 Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster, “Democratic Control of the Military in 
Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guard.” Conference on 'Democratic Control of Armed Forces in 
Central and Eastern Europe: Civil-Military Relations and Defence Planning in the New Era' (2000: Kiev, 
Ukraine) (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave, 2002). 
 14
for Peace (PfP) program remained the focal point for institutionalist approaches that 
explored policy transfer mechanisms with regard to international security.42 
In parallel, the advent of major theoretical paradigms, such as neo-realistic, post-
modernistic, (social) constructivist, liberalist, positivistic, and rational choice approaches, 
changed the respective methodological angles towards civil-military relations.43 In the 
view of this author, this trend towards rigid scholarly categorization detracted from the 
growing demand for a multidisciplinary approach to civil-military relations. 
In the context of decreasing scholarly interest in the question of civil-military 
relations in the early twenty-first century, the rise of the European Security and Defense 
Policy (ESDP) in the framework of the superordinated Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) of the European Union as a consequence of the Kosovo war in 1999, and 
with it the build-up of the European security architecture attracted scholarly attention.44 
As a consequence, the fourth-wave work dealt with civil-military relations in post-
conflict states45 as well as the initial missions and operations of ESDP with a view to 
civil-military cooperation.46 Along with that, domestic factors, characteristics, and norms 
within EU candidate states as well as institutional reform capability itself were 
examined.47 Only a few scholars paid attention to the overall context and incorporated 
                                                 
42 Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds, and Andrew Cottey, The Challenge of Military Reform in 
Postcommunist Europe: Building Professional Armed Forces (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). For 
a comprehensive overview that also touches upon locally orientated studies of the developing world (Latin 
America, Asia, and South Africa) see Diamond and Plattner, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy. 
43 According to its topic, this thesis does not investigate these theoretical approaches further. This has 
been done, i.e., by Jordan Baev and Edwin R. Micewski (eds.), Civil-military Relations Postgraduate 
Program. National Defense Academy, Vienna, in cooperation with G.S. Rakovsky Defense and Staff 
College, Sofia, December 2004, 16–23. Another comprehensive study is Diamond and Plattner, Civil-
Military Relations and Democracy. 
44 Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). 
45 Compare, i.e., George Christian Maior and Larry Watts (eds.), Globalization of Civil-Military 
Relations: Democratization, Reform and Security (Bucharest: Enciclopedia Publishing House, 2002). 
46 Reinhardt Rummel, “Der zivile Gehalt der Europaeischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik,” 
in Europa und Militaer - Europaeische Friedenspolitik oder Militarisierung der EU? Beitraege zur 
Militaergeschichte und Militaerpolitik; Bd. 7, ed. Lothar Schroeter (Schkeuditz, 2005), 83–105. 
47 Anthony Forster, Civil-Military and Security Sector Reform: West Looking East, International 
Relations and Security Network, http://www.ssronline.org/document_result.cfm?id=244 (accessed July 20, 
2009), 2–11. 
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cultural and case-based experiences and lessons learned. Yet, they generally did not 
comprehensively incorporate socio-cultural factors.48 Sociological aspects of status and 
role, however, are considered to be crucial for the general set-up of civil-military 
relations within a society and nation.49 Studies of the post-communist democracies or the 
debate about the crisis of civil-military relations in the U.S.50 provide evidence that 
problems can still arise within countries where the potential of political influence by the 
military leadership through coercion is virtually excluded. Even if those problems are of a 
different nature than those discussed here, they are still relevant to the principle question 
about the quality of a democratic society in that effectiveness of civilian control, its 
respective constitutional consequences, and the participative quality of a democratic 
society are linked to the consolidation of democracy as such. Against this background 
and as an exception to the trend, the little-appreciated work of Abenheim addressed 
national experiences with the social integration of soldiers over time and the cultural 
aspects of civil-military relations.51 
Scholars did address sociological factors and their ethical implications for the 
emerging privatization of security and the increasing recourse to private military 
companies in conflict regions. The prevailing argument is that increasing privatization 
                                                 
48 Michael Brzoska and Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Civil-Military Cooperation in Post-Conflict 
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction. Recommendations for Practical Action, SEF Policy Paper 30, Bonn, 
2008. As an exception, the work of Moskos, Williams and Segal incorporated postmodern structural and 
cultural changes. Compare Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and Dacid R. Segal (eds.), The 
Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
49 Compare first and foremost Abenheim´s work, Soldiers and Politics Transformed; additionally 
Desch, Civilian Control of the Military. 
50 Compare Abenheim, Soldiers and Politics Transformed; further see National Defense University. 
“An Interview with Michael G. Mullen,” Joint Force Quarterly, 54, 3rd quarter (2009): 7; further see E. J. 
Dionne Jr., "Let the Military on Campus,” Washingtonpost.Com, December 3, 2004, A.27, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A30182-2004Dec2.html. (accessed July 28, 2009). 
51 Compare on this subject further Eliot A. Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military 
Service (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1985); and Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, 
Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York: Free Press, 2002). Finally, for a contrarian view, one 
should pay attention to Martin L. van Creveld, The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to 
Irrelevance (New York; London: Free Press; Collier Macmillan, 1990); and Martin L. van Creveld, The 
Culture of War (New York: Presidio Press, 2008). 
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abroad weakens domestic civil-military ties.52 Like Bruneau and Trinkunas, who note 
that the literature continues to focus on traditional aspects of civilian control of the 
military, one could claim that new security challenges require a shift in methods to 
enhance defense efficiency and military effectiveness.53 
B. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE EU 
Work on civil-military relations generally concerns two dimensions. First, 
scholars investigate how procedural relations are set up institutionally on the strategic and 
operational levels. In this study, this is called the functional dimension. Second, scholars 
explore how the armed forces are embedded into society, how interaction takes place, and 
what the underlying principles and perceptions concerning civil-military relations are. In 
this study, this is called the sociological dimension. The functional dimension has been 
by far the more frequently researched one with regard to the development over the past 
10 years of the EU in general and ESDP in particular.54 
This thesis focuses on the latter, the sociological dimension. It investigates the 
conceptual genesis in connection with the usage of key terms. In doing so, it provides 
evidence to verify the underlying assumption that there is ambiguity regarding key terms 
in the field of civil-military relations within the framework of the EU, with substantially 
different connotations among EU member states, and that ambiguity has not been 
addressed comprehensively yet by parliaments, by European institutions, by soldiers or 
even scholars to the degree warranted by the needs of the moment. 
                                                 
52 Compare, i.e., Andrew Alexandra, Deane-Peter Baker and Marina Caparini (eds.), Private Military 
and Security Companies: Ethics, Policies and Civil-Military Relations (London; New York: Routledge, 
2008). This aspect is not further investigated in this study. 
53 They identify three global elements of democratic civil-military relations: civilian control, defense 
efficiency, and military effectiveness. Compare Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas, “Democratization 
as a Global Phenomenon and its impact on Civil-Military Relations,” Democratization 13, no.5 (2006): 
778–790. 
54 Aldis and Drent, Common Norms and Good Practices of Civil-Military Relations in the EU. A very 
comprehensive analysis is provided by Caforio, Sociology. It is not possible to give a complete overview of 
the numerous studies concerning the subject. Therefore, references are made only to publications that 
directly relate to the thesis subject. Compare recently Marco Overhaus, Zivil-Militaerisches 
Zusammenwirken in der Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik der EU, SWP-Studie, Berlin, May, 2010. 
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Hence, it is useful to investigate whether there are commonly accepted norms and 
values with regard to the relationship between citizens of EU member states and their 
military forces that have been officially agreed to and published.  
As a result of the research for this study, one has to note that such principles are 
not present in EU’s treaties of Rome (March 25, 1957), of Maastricht (February 7, 1993), 
of Amsterdam (October 2, 1997), of Nice (February 1, 2003), and of Lisbon (December 
1, 2009), nor are they explicit in criteria that accession candidate states must satisfy for 
membership in the EU. Accession candidates, such as post-communist countries, in 
addition to formal admission criteria for EU membership, are implicitly expected to 
accept unwritten rules and norms. But what are those norms with respect to civil-military 
relations? To explore them, distinct approaches to the different domains of civil-military 
relations should be examined. 
According to Greenwood,55 there are five domains: first, the relationship between 
the military and the state; second, the relationship between the military and the executive 
branch of government; third, the oversight power of the legislature; fourth, the 
relationship between the military and a country’s domestic security community; and fifth, 
the relationship between the military and pluralistic society at large. While the first three 
appear to belong more to the functional dimension, the fourth and fifth relate more to the 
sociological one. 
Besides this approach, other definitions include all relations between the military 
and civilian society, namely, between soldiers and citizens.56 If one follows liberal 
democracy theory, good civil-military relations are always linked to, and based on, the 
democratic control of the armed forces, which means that the military is unambiguously 
subordinated to the lawfully-elected democratic civilian authorities, who, in turn, do not 
meddle with purely professional military affairs. Additionally, it is assumed that the 
military leadership does not have unwarranted public influence beyond its professional 
                                                 
55 David Greenwood, “Resource Allocation and Resources Management,” in Common Norms and 
Good Practices of Civil-Military Relations in the EU, eds. Aldis and Drent, 139–140. 
56 Jasmina Glisic, “The Role of Public Opinion and the Media in Civil-Military Relations,” in 
Common Norms and Good Practices of Civil-Military Relations in the EU, Aldis and Drent, 83. 
 18
domain, i.e. public sector expenditure.57 Therefore, and even if not officially agreed to in 
official EU documents, this can also be assumed as the general position across EU 
member states. 
One main finding of this study is that, at the EU level, there is no comprehensive 
approach at all to the sociological dimension of civil military relations, but only a 
functional effectiveness based on time worn, non-comprehensive concepts which neglect 
the control issue. The EU is lacking a comprehensive approach to civil-military relations. 
But this does not contribute much to the question at hand. It seems as if everything is 
linked to “control”—a term that itself is open to many meanings freighted with 
considerable conflict and misunderstanding.  
Thus, to develop the argument further, it is useful to explore what stands behind 
the key term for good civil-military relations: the stressed perception of democratic 
control58 of the military. 
It is commonplace that civil-military relations can be gauged by the way 
interactions of policy and operations take place.59 Good democratic civil-military 
relations, as has also been stated, are normally subjected to a functional democratic 
control in state and society as well as the international system. Yet, a problem arises 
when investigating how this good is achieved in EU member states, as in other mature 
democracies:60 It is assumed that these countries have developed adequate civil-military 
relations, but when investigating how this control functions in fact, it seems to be the 
military’s professional adherence to democratic principles rather than the imposed 
                                                 
57 Jasmina Glisic, “The Role of Public Opinion and the Media in Civil-Military Relations,” in 
Common Norms and Good Practices of Civil-Military Relations in the EU, Aldis and Drent, 83. Compare 
further with regard to the question, “how public opinion shapes the context within which the military do 
their job” and how much trust the EU member states have in their military and how the agenda-setting 
potential of the media influences military legitimacy. Greenwood, Resource Allocation and Resources 
Management, 139. 
58 The following paragraph is based to a large extent on Douglas L. Bland, “Patterns in Liberal 
Democratic Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces & Society 27, no.4 (2001): 525–540. 
59 Compare this author, Zivil-Militaerische Beziehungen im Rahmen der ESVP, 1–3. 
60 For the purpose of this investigation it is not necessary to explore the question of whether—with a 
view to the post-communist countries—really all EU member states are mature democracies. 
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executive power of the civil authority to control the military in practice.61 Therefore, it is 
not only the institutional set-up and rule of law that provides the civil control, at least not 
alone, but rather the political legitimacy of the civil authority which also relies on the 
continuous will of the armed forces to value the democratic state. There have obviously 
been quite a few cases where armed forces, or, more explicitly, leading military figures, 
have not adhered to this will, with results that range from suspension to (attempts of) 
coups d’état.62 It is noted that the mere declaration that the military is controlled is no 
guarantee that it really is and also is no explanation of how this control works in the first 
place. The emerging harmony is, besides social and political harmony, the foundation for 
effective defense. It requires a culture which is based on a comprehensive framework of 
institutional set-up and civil authority. Hence, dogmatic demands for unconditional 
democratic civilian control of the military without explaining, at the same time, what 
exactly is meant by that, lack the necessary comprehensive approach. 
It is quite obvious that whatever is meant by democratic civilian control cannot be 
a matter of coincidence but has to rest on a sound conceptual and normative framework. 
At the domestic level, concepts and civil-military regimes63 can generally be found. 
However, institutional set-ups, rules, norms, principles, and decision-making procedures, 
all affecting civil-military relations, are different among EU member states due to their 
national cultural, historical, and political distinctiveness.64 However, the lack of such a 
conceptual and normative framework at the EU level is problematic, especially as it 
touches upon one central political challenge of the EU: its democratic legitimacy. 
                                                 
61 Compare, i.e., Kuhlmann, Primacy of Politics over Military Matters, 98. 
62 See footnote 29. 
63 For further explanation of the regime theoretical approach towards civil-military relations compare 
Bland, Patterns in Liberal Democratic Civil-Military Relations, 526–528. 
64 For more detailed explanation of key terms like principles (beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude), 
norms (standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations), rules (specific prescriptions or 
proscriptions for actions), and decision-making procedures (prevailing practices for making and 
implementing collective choices) compare Stephan Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: 
Regimes as Intervening Variables,” International Regimes. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 2–4. In 
Bland´s explanation: “principles and norms provide the basic defining characteristics of a regime, rules and 
decision-making procedures provide its main operating features”. Bland, Patterns in Liberal Democratic 
Civil-Military Relations, 531. 
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The lack of democratic legitimacy within the European Union became blatant 
after the negative referendums in The Netherlands and France during the ratification 
process of the Constitutional Treaty in 2006. One year before, the European Council had 
already noted a gap between EU citizens and EU institutions.65 To bridge this gap and to 
remedy the lack of legitimacy, the Council attempted to initiate a broad debate by holding 
a convention on the future of the EU. However, this undertaking failed. Remarkably, the 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CFSP), as well as the ESDP, were barely 
mentioned.66 However, looking at the speed of development of this policy area that 
defines the EU’s external activities to a large extent, it is only logical to explore questions 
of legitimacy in this policy area also, which relies upon civil and military capabilities of 
EU member states as well as the increasing build-up of EU means. 
In the context of civil-military relations in the framework of ESDP, an 
interchange of ideas through public debate within EU’s civil society and within EU’s 
institutional setting about the further transformation and integration of its armed forces 
seems indispensable with a view also to legitimacy. Legitimacy of ESDP, however, has 
so far only been addressed officially in an output-oriented manner in the context of ESDP 
mission results (output legitimacy) and with a view to civil-military cooperation 
effectiveness (the functional dimension). Legitimacy of ESDP has so far not been 
addressed in an input-oriented manner in terms of the sociologic dimension of EU’s civil-
military relations.67 This input-legitimacy in ESDP is based on the various democratic 
cultures, institutions, procedures, and norms of the respective EU member states—mainly 
through national parliamentary participation and control.68 On the one side, this input-
                                                 
65 Kommission 2008: “Europaeische Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr” at IFSH: 50 Jahre 
Bundeswehr, 50 Jahre „Innere Fuehrung:“ Anlass zu Reflexion und Reform.“ In Zurueckgestutzt, 
Sinnentleert, Unverstanden: die Innere Fuehrung der Bundeswehr, edited by Detlef Bald et al. Baden-
Baden, 2008, 1. 
66 Kommission 2008, Europaeische Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr, 2. 
67 Compare Council of the European Union, Report on the Implementation of the European Security 
Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World, Brussels, December 11, 2008, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/104630.pdf (accessed May 28, 
2010), 9. The claim “civil society and NGOs have a vital role to play as actors and partners,” refers only to 
conflict regions in the section about effectiveness, cohesion and capabilities. 
68 Kommission 2008, Europaeische Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr, 2-3. 
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legitimacy is linked to national constitutional limits with a view to the (decisions about 
the) employment of armed forces within the framework of ESDP.69 On the other side, the 
more greatly enhanced process of European integration of EU member states’ armed 
forces is desirable and necessary for the EU’s overall development. 
C. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS WITHIN ESDP 
There are five areas of ESDP: origins, decision making, capabilities, missions and 
operations, and strategic culture. Civil-military relations affect all of these areas in turn. 
However, this thesis only relates to the last one, that of strategic culture.70 Scholars have 
noted that, if there was a common EU strategic culture, it would be “heavily influenced 
by civilian-military synergies.”71 For others, a common strategic culture has clearly and 
unsurprisingly not developed among 27 disparate member states, unless it has been that 
of NATO as well as, in certain cases, somewhat that of U.S. military operations in the 
Iraqi and Afghan campaigns.72 
The debate about whether or not the EU is developing a common strategic culture 
has been ongoing since 1999. The opinions about the EU developing a strategic culture 
are split into two camps: the optimistic one is stressing the converging aspects within the 
realm of ESDP, and the pessimistic one pronounces divergence. The term “strategic 
                                                 
69 With a view to Germany compare, i.e., Christian Schaller, Rechtssicherheit im Auslandseinsatz. 
SWP-Aktuell, Berlin, 2008, http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=6634 
(accessed December 12, 2009). 
70 Compare, i.e., Cornish and Edwards, Strategic Culture of the European Union, 801–820; Johnston, 
Strategic Culture Revisited, 519–23; Johnston, Thinking about Strategic Culture, 32–64; Meyer, The Quest 
for a European Strategic Culture; Rynning, The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?, 479-496. 
The aim of this thesis as well as its scope do not allow for an in-depth discussion on the debate concerning 
strategic culture. This debate originates from the classic works of Thucydides, Sun Tzu and Clausewitz 
who grounded the argument that culture could influence national security policy. In conjunction with the 
prior literature review chapter, it should be noted that the rise of constructivism significantly advanced the 
theoretical work on cultural interpretations as it focuses on social structures at the system level, and 
includes identity, culture, norms, and ideas at the state level. The quintessential work on strategic culture 
has been accomplished 1995 by Johnson and marks the starting point of scholarly interest in EU member 
states. 
71 Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 315; Alfred C. Stepan and Yale 
University, Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 
265. 
72 Anand Menon, “Empowering paradise? The ESDP at ten,” International Affairs 85, no.2 (2009): 
244–245. 
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culture” has been challenged by the broadened term “security culture” as Howorth has 
pointed out. For him, “security culture” gets rid of the “heroic” and “martial” approach to 
the topic, and therefore is “more appropriate as a label for whatever collective mindset is 
in fact taking shape in the EU.” However, in terms of operationalization, Howorth, like 
most other scholars, uses both terms synonymously.73 For the purpose of 
operationalization, Meyer’s definition seems adequate. He proposes “strategic culture as 
comprising the socially transmitted, identity-derived norms, ideas and patterns of 
behavior that are shared among the most influential actors and social groups within a 
given political community, which help to shape a ranked set of options for a community’s 
pursuit of security and defense goals.”74 The conclusion for the time being is that the EU 
is developing some kind of strategic culture with areas of convergence but also remaining 
disparities among EU member states. 
As stated previously, civil-military relations within ESDP implicitly assume 
certain common propositions and perceptions. However, different national perceptions of 
security challenges have been a significant obstacle to developing comprehensive 
common EU policies.75 The development of a comprehensive and common civil-military 
perception within the EU is “a bottom-up process that requires the alignment of member 
states’ conceptions”76 (if there are any), thereby contributing to a common European 
Union strategic culture, an ambition implicitly set by the European Security Strategy 
(ESS).77 
                                                 
73 Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 18, 48, 178–206, 252. This denial of 
the role of military heroism is more than odd, when one considers that the two oldest EU democracies and 
their armies still retain a pantheon of military heroism in their soldierly heritage, even if such is less the 
fashion in continental Europe or especially in Germany. This issue merely highlights the problematic nature 
of this theme and the further requirement for analysis of same in the service of policy, practice and theory.  
74 Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture, 20. 
75 Alyson J. K. Bailes, “Designing a Comprehensive Security Policy for Europe and European 
States,” in Common Norms and Good Practices of Civil-Military Relations in the EU, eds. Aldis and Drent, 
151. 
76 Eva Gross, EU and the Comprehensive Approach, Danish Institute for International Studies. DIIS 
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In sum, despite the fact that increased civil-military cooperation in the definition 
being used has to be based on common norms of civil-military relations, this dimension 
has not yet been addressed officially. Civil-military relations in their sociological 
dimension have only been dealt with implicitly, despite the risk of varying perceptions 
and different intentions based on divergent norms regarding the matter. 
As stated in the 2008 report of the European Council on the implementation of the 
European Security Strategy (2003), coherence and coordination remain key challenges 
for EU security.78 However, at the institutional level, competences are dispersed within 
the complex structures of the European Council. A more integrated civil-military 
structure is necessary.79 Within the European Commission, the situation was even worse 
due to the internal struggle for competences among the different general directories. In 
some ESDP missions, competences have been distributed over all three pillars of the EU 
in the past. 
Having come into effect on December 1, 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon could 
improve the situation by streamlining the EU’s “unwieldy bureaucracy.”80 Formally the 
three-pillar structure of the EU is being dissolved, and this will probably lead to a more 
coherent EU program of action and will influence outside perceptions of the EU. The 
Lisbon Treaty includes basically the same provisions in the domain of CFSP and (as it is 
now called) CSDP81 as the ill-fated EU Constitutional Treaty. It is, however, intended to 
allow for a more active international role of the EU with regard to its stated ambitions in 
general and should provide a more coherent, effective, and visible Common Security and 
Defence Policy for the EU.82 CSDP will remain an integral part of CFSP and 
encompasses the deployment of civilian and military means for peacekeeping, conflict 
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prevention, and strengthening of the international community.83 The implementation is 
likely to depend to a high degree on the cooperation among the top three EU posts at the 
political level:84 the (permanent) President of the European Council, the President of the 
Commission, and the High Representative (HR) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
(at the same time Vice President of the European Commission and Commissioner for 
external relations). 
At the institutional level, decisions on CSDP matters will still require unanimous 
support of the EU member states85 within the domain of the European Council and 
without the participation of the Commission and the European Parliament (EP).86 
However, the High Representative now has the right to take initiatives and can, in 
cooperation with the Commission, resort to Commission instruments. The HR’s new role 
and double-hatting could therefore contribute to overall strengthening of the cohesion of 
EU crisis management even if it formally remains under intergovernmental and common 
competences. 
Yet, an ambiguity remains. As agreed, EU documents continuously demand more 
coherence, synergy, and cooperation. One possible conclusion is that the 27 EU member 
states not only have internalized the EU as part of their domestic policy, but still see the 
EU partially as an object of their respective foreign policies.87 In fact, the Treaty of 
Lisbon preserves national autonomy in the realm of CFSP and CSDP decision-making 
through ultimately continuing the principle of unanimity.88 
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The gap between the rhetorical integration ambition, and factual expressions of 
keeping distance from it, as could be observed during the ratification process of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, has yet to be bridged. Therefore, it can be doubted that the approach 
within the EU, up to now, is yet sufficient for the future shape of a common strategic 
culture. 
Hitherto there has not been, nor has there been an effort to prepare, a 
comprehensive EU concept with definitions of key terms and fundamental principles for 
civil-military relations.89  
Nonetheless, the EU has developed some approaches to the topic.90 However, 
these documents address only the domains of decision-making, operations and missions 
(implementation of civilian and military instruments in crisis management),91 or 
capabilities.92 Focusing solely on the functional dimension of civil-military relations, 
they totally omit the socio-cultural aspect. The initial outlining paper on civil-military 
relations within the ESDP, Civil-Military Co-ordination (CMCO), although rhetorically 
underlining “the central importance of CMCO as a culture of co-ordination,”93 refers 
solely to the technical and institutional necessity for effective co-ordination of civilian 
and military instruments in a comprehensive approach, but does not further elaborate the 
cultural aspects of the topic. What is described as “the need for a culture of co-ordination 
rather than seeking to put too much emphasis on detailed structures and procedures”94 
and as “an essential element in ensuring overall coherence in the EU’s response to a 
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crisis,”95 thereby adding an intrinsic element, is in fact not further filled with a cultural 
content that goes beyond the direct relationship to crisis response operations. Thus, the 
official perception of “culture” is left with a merely technical connotation. 
The related hypothesis is that this linguistic ambiguity contributed to an 
insufficient comprehension and perception of civil-military relations within the 
framework of ESDP and affected all follow-on conceptual work on the subject insofar as 
the strategic, cultural, and sociological dimensions were never really considered. This 
claim can be substantiated by recent officially agreed-upon announcements within the 
framework of ESDP. During the informal meeting of EU Defence Ministers in September 
2009 in Goteborg, Sweden, the nexus of civil-military relations for the ambitions of the 
European Security Strategy (ESS) from 2003 remained within the functional dimension 
only. “Civil-military requirements and synergies for future missions and operations”96 are 
linked only to capability development, not to the enhancement of a respective cultural 
environment. 
Another recent example is the Swedish EU Presidency Report on a civil-military 
capability development seminar.97 Based on “experiences from ESDP missions and 
operations”98 and with a view to “EU perspectives on future civilian and military 
capability development,”99 the findings and recommendations concerning future concepts 
emphasize coordination and cooperation efforts, thereby again taking into account only  
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the functional dimension of civil-military relations.100 The necessity for a harmonization 
of methodology and the lack of a respective formal coordination mechanism were noted 
only in the margin.101  
A dilemma for the EU’s crisis management ambitions is the “capability-
expectations gap: while the EU is taking on an increasing number of missions and 
developing a growing profile as a security actor, it does not always have the resources to 
back up its commitments.”102 This fact gives an indication as to why the overall strategic 
culture within the framework of ESDP was and remains driven merely by a functional 
focus. It is about “modalities”103 rather than mentalities. 
D. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AT THE DOMESTIC LEVEL 
Looking now at the domestic level, this section investigates the major cultural and 
sociological aspects of civil-military relations as they refer to the relationship between the 
military and society with a brief view of the EU member states of France and the United 
Kingdom. The investigation briefly covers the way the major military cultural 
intersections are developed among those EU member states. Together with the case of 
Germany,104 which is explored in more depth in the next chapter, the “big three” of the 
European Union105 are covered. If one follows the argument that France, the United 
Kingdom, and Germany are driving the European Union and ESDP, then insights on the 
domestic level could provide evidence for the explanation of the findings concerning the 
EU level.106 
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The underlying hypothesis is that the claimed deficiencies at the EU level are 
linked to cultural and sociological specifics at the domestic level and that national 
military cultures107 will continue into the transformation phase of integrated European 
Union civil-military structures. Transformation in that context addresses some of the 
various national characteristics of civil-military relations. 
Armed forces in this context are always understood as an institution which is 
inherently undemocratic in aspects of their inner structure due to its hierarchical 
organization and the requirements of operations, to include combat. Yet the European 
Union boasts armies in a democracy and, in fact, a union of democracies.  
This understanding follows an organizational sociological approach, which allows for the 
identification of specific organizational characteristics, which can be decoupled from 
individuals. Such a theoretical approach undergirds the present study and its essential for 
an examination of democratic civil military relations in the domestic politics, society and 
political culture of the leading EU nations. 
1. The Trend to End Conscription and the Role of Women at Arms 
With the end of the era of mass armies in Western Europe in the 1990s, many 
countries abolished conscription.108 Yet, conditionality in that matter is not given despite 
rising political pressure, as shows, for example, in the case of Germany, which is 
investigated in the following chapter.109 In contrast, the participation of women in the 
armed forces seems very well directly related to conscription; more concretely, “it seems 
                                                 
107 Fundamental differences among EU member states’ national leadership principles and national 
strategic cultures are still prominent, looking, i.e., at the fact that Germany still holds on to conscription 
while Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, and The Netherlands have transformed their armies into fully 
professional armed forces. 
108 Karl W. Haltiner, “The Decline of the European Mass Armies,” in Sociology, ed. Caforio, 361–
384. Conscription ended in the United Kingdom in 1963, when the British Army had all regular forces for 
the first time since 1939. In contrast, conscription did not end in France until 2001. France, the United 
Kingdom and Germany have percentagewise made about the same force reduction (35 percent) over the 
last 30 years. 
109 Since this is the overall trend, it is not considered necessary in this thesis to explore the causes for 
this development, but rather to investigate the causes for adhering to conscription against the trend and the 
majority of public opinion, which is accomplished in a later chapter on the German case. For the figures in 
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that the further existence of compulsory personnel for the military is the largest obstacle 
to an increase of Women Military Participation Ratio.”110  
The presence of women in the armed forces of EU member states is significantly 
lower in conscription-based systems, for example, Germany. But since the overall 
percentage of the total force is not in the two-digit figures for any EU member state and 
because women have admittance to all posts in most EU member states,111 the 
comparatively low level of female personnel in conscript systems is rather considered an 
adaptation trend with regards to the labor market than an indicator for gender equality 
and generally more open-minded and modern societies. 
The countries that do still have conscription in times of shrinking armed forces 
increasingly face the problem of fairness and equity in conscription, especially among 
cohorts with a strong birth rate. The decline of the conscript ratio further causes a decline 
in the military participation ratio throughout EU member states, thereby reducing the 
general degree of “military awareness” in the European Union’s societies.112 Because of 
the low conscription rates113 and the extension of voluntary recruitment, the systems in 
the respective states are sometimes called “de facto volunteer systems” or even “pseudo 
conscript systems.”114  
No European Union country forces its conscripts to serve on missions abroad 
outside the task of homeland or territorial defense.115 In this context, scholars note that 
the military structural difference between conscript systems and all-volunteer forces does 
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not justify any more “the dichotomy used in politics and sociology between conscript 
forces on the one hand and volunteer systems on the other. ... The transitions are 
gradual.”116 Forces have transformed structurally and functionally according to the 
changing security environment. Therefore, “the socio-psychological, political and legal 
impact would probably be much greater than the military structural one”117 for those 
countries still adhering to conscription as of now, if they abolished it in the future. In 
contrast, this thesis argues that the German case indeed reveals differences118 which 
could have a significant positive impact on EU military integration. The basic argument 
is that conscription is not only an individual burden; it is rather to be seen as societal 
participation in a central field of the executive authority. Thus, it complements 
parliamentary control of the military. 
2. Trade Unions and the Military 
The overall trend to abolish conscription has also drawn some attention to the 
question of renewing representation instruments (i.e., right of free association as in the 
trade union movement) for military personnel. Historically, in this vital civil military 
matter of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, conservative attitudes can be contrasted 
with modern ones.119 The end of the Second World War generally caused an overall drop 
of social prestige of the military profession in Western Europe. The downgrading of 
social status had an impact on the question of unionization in the countries where it 
applied. In those countries, for example, Belgium (or to a lesser degree Germany), 
modern attitudes called for innovative adaptations with regard to the labor market while 
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in countries with a strong military establishment, like France120 and the United Kingdom, 
conservative attitudes held that military unions were unthinkable and incompatible with 
the traditions of command and obedience in the armed forces.121  
In those countries, armed forces “have a special relationship with the civil power 
whereby the rights and privileges of the dominant social group are automatically 
guaranteed to members of the military: in this relationship there is no need to seek 
unionization to provide the political, social and economic rights of members of the 
organization for these will be always protected by the power elite with which the military 
is closely associated.”122 This is the case in the United Kingdom and in France, while it is 
not in Germany.123 In the United Kingdom, “military service has never emerged as a 
hallmark of citizenship. Instead, in Great Britain, for example, it can be argued that an 
inalienable right of the individual has been that of not serving in armed forces.”124 
On the one hand, this “Anglo-Saxon” or “insular”125 model corresponds to 
conservative attitudes in the meaning explained above. On the other hand, it is to be 
distinguished from another model, which can be called “continental,”126 and which 
applies, for example, to France and, in a variable form, to Germany. This model 
accordingly corresponds as well to conservative as to modern attitudes: conservative, 
because the historical social strength and autonomy of the military establishment has so 
far prevented significant unionization developments (as in France); modern, because “the 
ongoing relationship between military institutions and citizenship creates a very specific 
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political culture in which military service ... is defined as an integral part of citizenship. 
This recognizes that the institutionalization of citizen conscription was an essential 
component in the emergence of Western parliamentary institutions.”127  
Hence, this continental model of the “citizen-soldier” in the second half of the 
twentieth century includes a protective dynamic, which allows for social change within 
the parent society being mirrored in the possibility for systematic representation of the 
interests of military personnel.128 
The aspect that the role of the soldier corresponds historically much more to the 
role of the citizen than it does in the United Kingdom puts France, which abolished 
conscription very late, and Germany in the same category. 
3. Military Education and Academic Research 
It is possible to view the officer corps as the most vital part of the armed forces 
due to its leadership role, which affects, among other factors, ethics and mindset, 
including the democratic spirit of the armed forces.129 It has therefore a key role in civil-
military relations. Thus, it is considered reasonable to also look into major features of 
national military education of officers. 
While in Germany almost all cadets are expected to accomplish academic studies 
at one of the two armed forces universities, the officer education process in the United 
Kingdom differs significantly. The great majority of British officer candidates already 
hold a degree, and military academies are therefore strictly distinguished from 
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Without going into detail about the educational system of each state, it is worth 
noting that a nexus between military sociological education and related career fields and 
tasks, like personnel matters or counseling of military leaders, does not exist at the 
domestic level.130 
The way in which military sociological research is driven and the way it is 
organized could give an indication about the quality of civil-military relations in the 
respective countries. The related hypothesis is that the form in which military 
sociological research is organized is directly related to the respective national culture 
with regard to military issues. More concretely, a country with a state-run research 
program would mirror a society which is, outside the military organization, much less 
interested in military affairs, as is the case in a country with a strong involvement of the 
private sector..131 
As a result, military sociological research in France and Germany is mainly 
governmentally driven through national research institutes,132 while it is more balanced 
between publicly and privately owned centers, including freelancers, in the United 
Kingdom. Freelancers also work in Germany and France, but to a much lesser degree, 
while collaboration with universities is to be observed in all three countries.133 But this 
fact also concerns the continental European experience of soldiers and universities, which 
in the case of the UK departs from that of France and especially Germany. Strategic 
studies and military affairs still wrongly suffer from the dark legacy of the twentieth 
century, while in the UK the relations of universities and soldiers (as in the U.S.) is more 
benign one.134 
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The countries with state-run institutes, like France and Germany, are exposed to 
criticism that notes a monopoly of the supervising Ministry of Defense and doubts 
whether independent and free research is feasible in these conditions.135 
4. Military Culture 
A cultural aspect that is undergoing transformation is the military identity. 
Western European armed forces are under pressure from their parent societies, the 
political elite, and the international community “to change [their] exclusiveness into a 
more civilianized outlook. The military has lost some of its classic military functions 
regarding the national security of the country ... and gained some new military functions 
reflecting operations other than war. Contemporary armed forces in Europe [and] soldiers 
from different countries ... are developing a new sense of multicultural military identity. 
This means the overwhelming conversion of a nation-based military mind into an 
international military identity.”136 But this development brings along also the widening 
of “the cultural gap between civilian values and military values.”137  It is worth noting in 
this context that culture is not inherited but learned and that it derives not from genes but 
from a social environment.138 
The socio-cultural environment in EU member states changes, and this also 
affects their armed forces. Post materialistic values and “greater cultural diversity, the 
essence of postmodernism,”139 affect traditional values in a way that weakens them and 
strengthens individual rights. “Soldiers are no longer motivated by patriotism. They are 
much more interested in their working conditions than before; and there is a decline of 
trust in institutions in general and in military institutions in particular.”140 However, it 
can be assumed that through the character of ESDP missions and operations in the past, 
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public confidence in the military has in general regained strength, with around a two-
thirds positive vote in France and Germany, and over 80 percent of confidence in the 
United Kingdom.141 
The relationship between a parent society and its armed forces is extremely 
complex and dynamic. The responsiveness of the public to military operations and 
missions is unique to every EU member state. Notwithstanding the basic trend that, even 
from formerly pacifist and military-critical parts of a parent society, interventions within 
the realm of ESDP have been increasingly accepted by EU citizens, there has been a 
backlash. If one follows the argument that, at the domestic level, a parent society has 
been disappointed by the results of ESDP missions and operations. It is possible to argue, 
that, despite a generally still positive attitude towards the EU and even ESDP, the 
reluctance to be in favor of a leading national role in those missions and operations 
increases in the face of the manifest problems of security building and peace enforcement 
in the shadow of the disorder of the twenty-first century. This fact promotes the 
ambiguity to be in favor and against ESDP developments at the same time, which, in 
turn, has a significant impact on national behavior at the EU level. 
At the domestic level, and without looking at the micro level of military 
subcultures, such as the differences between one country’s army, navy, and air force, one 
can note national differences within the major aspects of culture, military routine, 
hierarchy, and discipline, when contrasting respective EU member states.142  
There seems to be a common international military culture in the Euro-Atlantic 
space, granted the historical development of armies and societies, that could be described 
as homogenous, and this military culture obviously differs from a civilian business 
organization’s culture.143 This circumstance leads to two conclusions: first, military and 
civilian cultures are sui generis problematic concerning compatibility; and, second, 
military cultures could still differ significantly when compared nationally. When, for 
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example, military academies and officer education are compared, Germany and France 
appear to be rather institution-oriented, which is connected to their officers sustaining 
lifetime commitment to the armed forces. 
On the contrary, in the United Kingdom careers are generally shorter, which has 
an effect on the perception of military life that is not seen as much in the center as in 
France and Germany.144 However, when it comes to the degree of coerciveness, the 
French system is structurally much stricter than the German or British ones, which are 
considered to be more “enabling” in nature.145 Along the same line, discipline is not as 
much of an issue in military academies in Germany as it is in France, where it has a very 
high importance, originating from the bureaucratic and centralistic Gaullism, which gives 
great importance to state institutions and which emphasizes formalism in military culture. 
In the United Kingdom, military discipline also has a very high standing. However, this is 
for other reasons, such as the distinctive British hierarchy within the military and the 
absolute power of its academies.146 
With the change away from conscription in France in the middle-1990s, and the 
general trend towards a more civilian, businesslike culture within the armed forces, it will 
be interesting to observe a possible change over the next decades either towards adopting 
armed forces or towards a conservative backlash granted the shared combat experience in 
distant lands, as well as the potential for a growing sense of military caste in the absence 
of conscription and the socio economic ills since the crash of 2008. 
The question of whether the end of conscription causes a disconnect of the armed 
forces from their parent society, which weakens the democratic spirit within the military, 
could not be answered at this point. It will, however, be discussed in the next chapter, 
together with the question of whether the indisputably increasing lack of broad personal 
experience of military service alienates the parent society from its armed forces and from 
being interested in international security.147 
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III. INNERE FUEHRUNG 
A. GERMAN ARMED FORCES AND INNERE FUEHRUNG148 
Innere Fuehrung has become the trademark of the Bundeswehr, and its character 
and development are closely connected with the history of the German soldier in the 
modern era. This chapter merely gives an introduction to the development of the German 
Armed Forces, the Bundeswehr, built up after the Second World War as new West 
German Armed Forces. Longer, more comprehensive works on the history of the 
Bundeswehr have already been accomplished by scholars.149 The aim of this chapter, in 
fact, is to provide an overview of the civil-military concept and philosophy of Innere 
Fuehrung, implemented in conjunction with the build-up of the Bundeswehr. The 
German case, through Innere Fuehrung, can be considered unique with regard to the 
degree German armed forces have been integrated into state and society, especially after 
the reunification of Germany in 1990. Innere Fuehrung formed the basis for the swift and 
relatively easy manner in which the soldiers of the East German armed forces, the 
Nationale Volksarmee,150 were transformed from a dangerous opposing force into a 
unified German army. 
With one foot still in the shadow of the Second World War, but with the other 
foot already in the light of forging alignment with the West and NATO, Germany’s first 
Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer (Christian Democratic Union [CDU]), in 1950 ordered the 
development of an initial concept for the possible build-up of new West German armed 
forces in the framework of a European army. Besides the question of how to structure the 
new army to meet the needs of the European Defense Community and NATO´s 
requirements, it was imperative to come up with an internal arrangement that would 
prevent political misuse of orders and would inhibit the army from becoming a “state 
                                                 
148 See footnotes 10, 11, 16. 
149 See footnote 16. 
150 For a cultural description of the Nationale Volksarmee see Abenheim, Soldiers and Politics 
Transformed, 13, 17–19, 22, 23, 45; shorter see Van Creveld, The Culture of War, 364–374. 
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within the state.”151 The bad experiences of the German armed forces, the “Reichswehr,” 
during the period of the democratic Weimar Republic—experiences which unveiled the 
incompatibility of such armed forces with democracy—and the recent nemesis of the 
“Wehrmacht, in national socialism” led to the demand for a new model for the army.152 
Concerning the military strategic framework for the Bundeswehr, the 
supranational European Defence Community (EDC) was foreseen, especially by France, 
as a multinational organization that would exclude nationally functioning German Armed 
Forces and instead integrate them into a supranational structure that would furthermore 
“promote the idea of the United States of (Western) Europe.”153 It was somewhat akin to 
the same unifying and controlling idea as undergirded the coal and steel community of 
the same time. But the EDC never came into being, and West Germany was instead 
integrated into NATO and the Western European Union (WEU). The issue of integration 
at different levels was the main force behind this development. Beyond the integration at 
the systemic level of international security, the German public debate focused on the 
integration of the future West German Armed Forces into the constitutional framework. 
Thus, at the domestic level, the issue was about “the place of the Bundeswehr in society, 
about the political control of its leadership, and about the mechanisms necessary to 
guarantee its compatibility with democracy.”154 The constitutional set-up therefore 
comprises not only general conscription but also the individual right for conscientious 
objection, which obligates those, making use of this constitutional right, to instead 
perform other civil duties (“Zivildienst”). At the individual level, the soldiers should be 
integrated with “as much civil spirit and behavior as possible into the everyday life of the 
armed forces.”155 
                                                 
151 Wilfried von Bredow, “Germany,” in The Political Role of the Military. An International 
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152 Ibid., 146–152. 
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154 Ibid., 148. 
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The new German soldier should be political in the sense that he defends freedom 
of self-determination and social justice via participation in the life of a democratic state 
and society. However, the creation of the Bundeswehr had to rely in part on the military 
expertise of former Wehrmacht officers.156 The result of the first conceptual 
developments for the internal arrangement of West German Armed Forces, “Inneres 
Gefuege,”157 was in large part driven by Wolf Graf von Baudissin,158 a former officer of 
the Wehrmacht along with others. He reinvented the guiding principle of the citizen in 
uniform—a central ideal with a long European tradition. This tradition is tied to the 
Prussian military reformers around General Gerhard Scharnhorst in the time span from 
1807 to 1813 and encompasses the idea of congruency of a civil society and its armed 
forces.159 Together with the military resistance against Adolf Hitler and the establishment 
of a tradition of the Bundeswehr on its own story since 1955, these three pillars were to 
form the tradition of the Bundeswehr and are still valid today. Baudissin and the other 
reformers provided a sociopolitical framework to lessen the fundamental tension between 
armed forces and democratic society. His comrades and he did so with the placement of 
the cannon of basic rights of West German Basic Law for soldiers.160 In Baudissin’s own 
words: “Only the integration of the soldier into civil life provides him with the experience 
of those values he stands for.”161 
It was a general consensus in West German civil society and among politicians 
that the military traditions of German armed forces could not restore either the 
Reichswehr or the Wehrmacht. Baudissin still had to face strong opposition during the 
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rearmament phase of West Germany in the 1950s from certain former officers of the 
Wehrmacht who wished to retain the privileges of their former estate or who refused to 
accept the role of the soldier in national socialism in its full dimensions. From the point 
of view of these so called “traditionalists,” armed forces had traditional principles, norms, 
and values that were incompatible with democracy. Therefore, they dismissed or other 
belittled Innere Fuehrung.162 Instead, they embraced a military romanticism and apologia 
which, nonetheless, never assumed the dimensions as such had prior to 1945 or 1914 in a 
society that was fed up with soldiers and war. 
Being the opposition party at the time, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) were 
suspicious about the democratic compatibility of the envisaged new West German Armed 
Forces because of the experience of the German left with soldiers and domestic politics in 
modern history. The reintroduction of conscription was disputed with a view to a 
justification that was purely functional in terms of NATO manpower requirements.163 
However, the idea of preventing the future Bundeswehr from self-isolation through the 
periodic draft of all young men as citizens in uniform would reconcile German civil 
society and its armed forces. This idea ultimately became reality. In the course of the 
1950s, and especially after the Godesberg declaration of 1959, Social Democrats 
accepted the new concept, which had been named Innere Fuehrung in 1953. However, the 
SPD demanded further political checks and balances, which were established in the form 
of parliamentary control of the German armed forces within German Basic Law and in 
the form of a Parliamentary Commissioner, an ombudsman who assists the German 
parliament (Bundestag) in exercising its supervision and control over the Bundeswehr. 
He can be petitioned directly by any soldier for his/her case of complain, thus being 
legally entitled to bypass the chain of command. Furthermore, the responsibility for 
financial and administrative tasks was assigned to a civilian defense administration by 
German Basic Law. Together with the constitutional right of conscientious objection, 
Germany got an extensive legal and institutional set-up with regard to its armed forces. 
To this day, the Bundeswehr is the only “parliamentary army” worldwide. 
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In addition to these checks and balances, former Federal Minister of Defence, 
Franz Josef Strauss (Christian Social Union—CSU), in 1958 had established an advisory 
board for questions on Innere Fuehrung. This board, “Beirat Innere Fuehrung,” which 
consists of mostly civilians who are professionally experienced in education and 
personnel leadership and management, was designed to advise the Federal Minister of 
Defence in those questions. It remains an important force for the spirit and body of the 
Bundeswehr and its reflection of constitutional principles in accord with West and United 
German society. 
The political legacy of the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht formed a problematic 
issue for the self-image of the Bundeswehr, which had to be based on the principles of 
Innere Fuehrung. The years from 1919 until 1945 served poorly as a pantheon of the 
ideas of duty, honor and country. However, the majority of officers and non-
commissioned officers of the new Bundeswehr had served in the Wehrmacht and even in 
the Reichswehr.164 That fact made it unlikely that, with the exception of military 
resistance against Hitler, they could empathetically accept the tradition of Prussian 
reforms, while developing a new tradition of the Bundeswehr, which, of course, was 
unfeasible in what was an army created nearly from scratch and with no baptism of fire in 
the Cold War. 
The traditionalist camp, which was opposed by the “reformers,” was prominent 
until 1982, when then-Federal Minister of Defence, Hans Apel (SPD), established 
unambiguous guidelines on the military tradition of the Bundeswehr. These guidelines 
categorically rejected any kind of tradition with the Wehrmacht as an institution or with 
individual Wehrmacht officers. The sole exception was to be the men and women who 
participated in the resistance against Adolf Hitler, which culminated in the failed 
assassination attempt by Colonel Claus Graf Schenk von Stauffenberg on July 20, 
1944.165 Although the guidelines on tradition, issued in 1965, were the first attempt to 
                                                 
164 Although a Committee of Experts on Personnel Matters was established in 1955 in order to 
prevent those former Wehrmacht officers that had verifiable been entangled with the national socialist 
terror to be able to enter the new West German Armed Forces, this author claims that it was practically 
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address the issue constituted by the phantom of the Wehrmacht166 (and to a certain extent 
its predecessor, the Reichswehr), it was not until 1982, when the second guidelines on 
tradition were issued, that this identity paradigm shifted to a focus on the West German 
military in its own right. A new generation of soldiers, almost 30 years after the first 
swearing-in of Bundeswehr recruits in 1955, added to this development.  
Before that, isolated attempts were made by some generals to challenge political 
decisions in the context of educational reforms within the Bundeswehr.167 The attempts 
were initiated to accommodate the social change that took place around 1969 by then–
Federal Minister of Defence, Helmut Schmidt (SPD), or concerning NATO´s double-
track decision in 1979; but they failed and resulted in the critiques’ dismissal.168 The 
progress in the decade from the 1980s until 1990s saw the generations of the first years of 
the Bundeswehr vanish and the intensity of this debate lessened in the face of German 
unity and the reorientation of the Bundeswehr to new roles and missions. The issue of 
soldierly tradition re emerged in the middle of this decade in an incident that lies outside 
the scope of this study. 
B. INNERE FUEHRUNG: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
The fundamental ideas of Innere Fuehrung were already codified in the Legal 
Status of Military Personnel Act in compliance with West German Basic Law in 1956. 
Thereby were constitutional rights codified together with military duties. Hereafter, civic 
rights and liberties also apply to the military realm and can only be abridged by 
requirements of military duty. In this context, soldiers retain active and passive voting 
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order that implies a criminal act must not be followed; basic military obligation and 
military duty of allegiance are geared towards German free democratic basic order, not 
towards a person or a specific government.169 
With the implementation of this legal status, based on the cannon of basic rights 
of West German Basic Law, the foundations needed to balance the principal tension 
between the functional necessities of a military institution on the one hand and 
democratic society and its social order on the other hand had been laid in accordance with 
the rule of law. As a consequence, the legal status of each German soldier gives him/her 
the same rights as every other German citizen, and with that, by far more than soldiers of 
most of the other EU member states.170 
Over time, several changes took place concerning the constitutional and 
regulatory set-up, but the underlying civil-military principles are still valid: “as much 
integration of the armed forces into civilian society as possible and as much civil control 
as possible in order to keep the armed forces compatible with the norms, values, and 
attitudes of a democratic society.”171 
In compliance with the Legal Status of Military Personnel Act, the Joint Service 
Regulation ZDv 10/1, Innere Fuehrung (Leadership Development and Civic 
Education),172 published in 1972, 1993, and in 2008, and the complementary Joint 
Service Regulation ZDv 12/1, “Politische Bildung” (Political and Civic Education)173 
together form the regulatory basis for the Bundeswehr and comprise the key features and 
principles of Innere Führung. Both have been modified multiple times since the first 
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release of their precursor, the “guidelines for the education of the soldier” in 1957.174 
One of the modifications of the central Joint Service Regulation, ZDv 10/1, was made in 
1993 in the light of German reunification that had taken place three years earlier. The 
authors were fully aware that, at this point in time, the amendments could only be seen as 
preliminary. In light of the urge to integrate soldiers from the Nationale Volksarmee and 
in order to come to terms with this institution, Joint Service Regulation 10/1, the 
superordinate regulation, focused primarily on the issue of political education. It could, 
however, not accommodate the beginning of German military out-of-area engagement 
that immediately followed in 1994.175 
It took until 2007 for the current version of Joint Service Regulation ZDv 12/1 
and until 2008 for the current version of Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1 to be issued. 
These documents reflect not only the global political security changes which made 
obsolete territorial homeland defense as the sole reasoning for armed forces, but they also 
mirror the reality of robust operations for the Bundeswehr, as well as social developments 
that, for example, led to the opening of military service for women in 2001. This was the 
first time that those regulations had been marked releasable to the public.176 
Laying out the foundations and principles of Innere Fuehrung, as well as 
objectives and requirements, norms and leadership culture, and the areas of application, 
Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1 “is the most important regulation for service in the 
Bundeswehr.”177 It clearly states that Innere Fuehrung “ensures a maximum of military 
effectiveness,” and, at the same time, “guarantees a maximum of freedom and rights for 
soldiers.”178 It reassures the guiding principle of the “citizen in uniform”179 who should 
be a free man/ woman, a responsible citizen, and a fully fledged soldier. In conjunction 
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with the legal, political, and social foundations of Innere Fuehrung, its principles180 form 
the basis for a cooperative leadership culture of the Bundeswehr. 
In the context of various simultaneous operations abroad, the aspect of political 
education is again emphasized in Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1. Military leaders are 
obligated to communicate to the soldiers under their command not only comprehensively 
about the political justification of the deployment, but also to provide essential 
knowledge about the country of deployment, be it political, cultural, or social. This way, 
German soldiers should be reassured as citizens in uniform and intrinsically motivated to 
fulfill their duty.181 Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1 explains the necessity for all 
soldiers to be familiar with the organizational principles and leadership cultures of other 
countries’ armed forces in the context of multinational operations, as well as those of 
Non-Governmental Organizations.182 
Studies have ascertained that “there is the insight on the political level as well as 
in the new version of ZDV 10/1 that especially peace keeping and peace enforcement 
missions require soldiers with a high degree of sensibility for communication and inter-
cultural competence and that therefore an education in the sense of “Innere Fuehrung” 
could be very helpful.”183 
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Moreover, evidence has been provided that Innere Fuehrung is in fact identity-
building together with the ideal of the “citizen in uniform.”184 Reasons for that can be 
found, for example, in other areas of application, such as compatibility of family and 
duty, pastoral care and the practice of religion, welfare and recreation, or medical care.185 
Looking at out-of-area deployments with combat operations, Innere Fuehrung has 
proven its suitability.186 Yet, with a view to the further development of Innere Fuehrung, 
one has to note a lack of political guidance at the domestic level, which might become 
problematic.187 
C. INNERE FUEHRUNG AND ESDP—AN ONGOING DEBATE188 
At the time that Graf Baudissin and others designed Innere Fuehrung, the guiding 
principle of the citizen in uniform was substantiated by the idea of a citizen who is 
actively democratic and through his conviction has an intrinsic motive to protect his 
country and fellow citizens. Accordingly, civic education as key features of Innere 
Fuehrung aims at explaining the political justification for the Bundeswehr, not only for 
outside defense, but also for its democratic legitimacy as a well-fortified democracy. This 
approach was consistent with the system of conscription until the end of the Cold War. It 
began to be challenged, however, with the beginning of out-of-area operations and the  
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broadening of the Bundeswehr’s tasks beyond mere territorial homeland defense in the 
mid-1990s, and those challenges caused related discussions about conscription that 
started time and again. 
This ongoing discussion189 focuses on the question of whether Innere Fuehrung is 
a contemporary concept and philosophy which is suitable for today’s armed forces. The 
disputants do not explicitly resort to the Wehrmacht, yet they basically draw upon the 
same traditionalists’ arguments.190 In the context of increasing combat operations, it is 
argued that Innere Fuehrung, as good as it might be during peacetime operation, reaches 
its limits in times of multinational operations. Neither, they claim, can a tradition and 
identity that have been artificially designed at a drawing-board substitute the necessary 
role models, nor can Innere Fuehrung dictate the tradition necessary in order to cope with 
life-threatening environments that increasingly demand recourse to military “secondary” 
virtues. But if a military banishes democracy in favor of twenty-first century combat and 
security building, how then could it possibly be a force for democratic principles?  
In a way, this reasoning corresponds with Huntington’s argument, stated earlier in 
this study, that “military professionalism,” especially within the officer corps, is the 
decisive concept to keep the military out of politics and will make the officer corps focus 
its loyalty on the military ideal. However, this approach towards military professionalism 
is challenged through this study. This author argues that the opposite applies, namely, 
that the power of Innere Fuehrung has not only overcome the problematic issue of 
tradition of the Bundeswehr over time, but it has also anchored German armed forces into 
democracy for the first time in history. Innere Fuehrung is opposed to a purpose-rational 
concept of military technocratic patterns of thought and behavior, which, in worst case, 
might lead to the delimitation of force.191 Innere Fuehrung has also proven its validity 
and its unique suitability for multinational operations, in general, and CSDP operations, 
in particular. In this regard, it would also match demands within the functional dimension 
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of civil-military relations. “In order to be fully combat-effective, the modern soldier must 
be deeply convinced of the superiority of the social and political system he stands and 
fights for.”192 
Scholars have noted a discrepancy between the original ambitions of Innere 
Fuehrung and the current situation.193 They note a disentanglement of the Bundeswehr 
from its parent society, caused by the new spectrum of tasks together with a decreasing 
democratic legitimacy due to the significant downsizing of conscripts. Moreover, the 
remaining conscripts are not employed in operations other than territorial homeland 
defense, which means that they are not employed at all in today’s scenarios.194 
Other scholars investigate the seeming discrepancy between the “citizen in 
uniform” and the image of the soldier as a “warrior.”195 
As has been stated, the form of military service among EU member states differs 
between compulsory and volunteer military systems. Along with different military 
cultures, different leadership philosophies, traditions, as well as unequal legal and social 
status of soldiers, the EU is challenged to cope with these matters and to harmonize in a 
way that reaches far beyond technical synchronization and tactical or operational 
interoperability. Security has a social and cultural dimension which has, over the past ten 
years, hardly been addressed and very little progress has been made in this field. 
Attempts to overcome the slow integration progress of national armed forces within the 
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EU have their origins long before ESDP existed.196 But those attempts cannot belie the 
fact that the EU still lacks a comprehensive integration concept. 
Notwithstanding comprehensive political cooperation and various missions and 
operations, the EU has not yet developed a common EU legal status for soldiers. In 
practice, this causes a clash of the different national systems. While in some areas, such 
as, for example, voting right or freedom of association, the impact on daily multinational 
military service is lesser, this is not the case in others. In those areas, for example 
disciplinary right, legal protection and prosecution of soldiers, or bindingness of orders, 
interference with military service operations might take place. A subjective perception of 
being treated unprivileged in comparison to others could, at the individual level, have a 
devastating effect in terms of trust, motivation, and morale. 
It is to note, that recently the European Organisation of Military Associations 
(EUROMIL), founded in 1972, seems to gain strength as an “umbrella organisation 
consisting of 37 national military associations and trade unions, and is starting to attend 
to the social and professional interests of military personnel of all ranks in Europe.”197 
EUROMIL promotes human rights, fundamental freedoms and socio-professional 
interests of soldiers, such as inclusion into social legislation by the EU, by monitoring 
and advocating in multinational negotiations on the European level. Among other 
matters, EUROMIL “seeks to raise awareness about the right of association in EU armed 
forces and to encourage the audience to consider servicemen as “citizens in uniform”, 
entitled to certain inalienable human rights.”198 
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One causal explanation for the deficiency is the level of integration of EU’s 
military forces and structures. While certain projects on military integration can be 
considered very successful,199 the EU still lacks a comprehensive military integration 
approach. Compared to NATO, for example, the EU does not yet have a standing 
integrated military structure. So far, it has to be generated for every ESDP/ CSDP 
mission individually. Another indicator is the cultural aspect of language regime. While it 
is clear in NATO that English is the operational language, this does not apply 
automatically for the EU. 
A common European approach to security requires a common European 
comprehension of security. Only then European soldiers would have a clear vision of the 
political causes for their missions. Unfortunately, the Lisbon Treaty has not provided a 
common vision concerning European security and defense. 
 
                                                 
199 See footnote 196. In addition, the recent initiative on ”Synchronized Armed Forces Europe” 
(SAFE) as an intermediate step towards a European Army should also be mentioned, although, in the logic 




The transformation of European Union forces is still in its infancy. Different 
national scopes prove that heterogeneity persists among EU member states with a view to 
the possibility of further “Europeanized” forces. If a common strategic culture is wanted, 
the role of European soldiers would have to be explored and a common view developed, 
in particular concerning the relationship between armed forces and society in the 
European Union. 
A common view is also important because of the involvement of the EU in 
political processes of state-building in ESDP missions. These processes can be seen as 
involving the use of armed force as a part of a broader effort to promote political and 
economic reforms with the objective of transforming a society emerging from conflict 
into one at peace with itself and its neighbors.  
But apart from those EU typical missions and operations, the thought that EU 
military capabilities will increasingly be challenged with combat scenarios, should not be 
dismissed in principle. ESDP’s/ CSDP’s scope and the associated aspect of a EU strategic 
culture have proven to be of a dynamic nature. If one follows the argument that an EU 
identity would ultimately develop through “de-Americanization" in order to find common 
ground among the 27 diverse EU member states, then this might, despite the fuzziness of 
the term “de-Americanization,” affect NATO´s coherence.200 That having noted, a 
broader EU military scope could be envisaged as an aftermath of a growing antagonism 
between the EU and the U.S., and de facto neutralize the overlap of membership in both, 
NATO and EU. The way, NATO and the EU are being treated differently as well in 
politics as in literature provides evidence in this regard. As a consequence, the topic of 
this study would gain even more relevance. 
                                                 
200 Compare Andrei S. Markovits, Uncouth Nation. Why Europe Dislikes America (Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), 201-223; further see Timothy Garton Ash, Free World. 
America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West (New York: Vintage Books/ Random House, 
2004), 200-202; another example is Compare, i.e., Varwick, Euroarmee, 51. 
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The cultural and sociological aspects of civil-military relations refer to the 
relationship between the military and society as it encompasses aspects of social 
integration, such as recruitment and resettlement, military education, and military aid to 
the civil community.201 An EU comprehensive civil-military approach should thus rest 
on a sound framework at the international political and strategic level that includes the 
sociological dimension. 
EU civil society needs to come to terms with its military and its broadened and 
increasingly complex tasks. Only then will it be reciprocally possible to convince “that 
society at large appreciates their performance”202 as citizen soldiers as opposed to 
mercenaries, and provides them with trust, confidence, respect, and prestige. Moreover, 
the matter of a future common European army and its leadership culture is non-
detachably intertwined with the future of the EU as a whole, that is to say the self-image 
and the balance of responsibilities, duties and rights at the polity level, among its society 
and at the individual level. The meager statements and remarks in official EU documents 
speak volumes in that regard. EU soldiers feel that they are not on solid ground/ 
concerning their employer.203 The problematique that nationally assured rights and 
constitutional and social values could be partially sacrificed within the multinational 
environment of a CSDP operation in favor of a tactical and operational determinism that 
overemphasizes combat in the traditional sense and/or which tramples on necessary civil-
military practices of great merit, should be addressed. 
One step to accomplish that at the political level could be the development of a 
European White Paper on security and defense204 which would also foster legitimacy 
within the EU as it would communicate with and explain to European society the EU’s 
political vision. Another step could be the strengthening of the European Parliament in 
                                                 
201 Greenwood, Resource Allocation and Resources Management, 140. 
202 Kuhlmann, Primacy of Politics over Military Matters, 90. 
203 Compare, i.e., Varwick, Euroarmee, 48. 
204 Compare ibid. Obviously, and because the EU is rather a polity and not a state, the hand-over of 
EU member states‘ national sovereignty and the delegation of national competences to the EU level is an 
ongoing and partially tenacious process. This process is multifacetted and cannot be investigated in its 
entirety within the scope of this study. 
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CFSP and CSDP matters, for example through decision taking authority and the 
establishment of a permanent parliamentary committee on security and defense matters. 
The necessity for parliamentary decisions in the realm of CFSP and CSDP would, at the 
institutional level, strengthen democratic legitimacy. Those thoughts have already been 
expressed in the 1950s in conjunction with the European Defence Community that was 
envisaged by some in the early 1950s but never came into being.205 
At the individual level, military education, not only training, will have to be 
Europeanized, for example institutionally by establishing a European military academy. 
As has been noted in this study, a nexus between military sociological education and 
related career fields and tasks does not exist at the domestic level.206 At the EU level, 
initiatives, such as the French ERASMUS207 program, which is aimed to provide EU 
officers with knowledge about different military leadership philosophies, or the further 
enhancement of the European Security and Defence College,208 seem to address this gap 
partially.209 
In order to cope with the related challenges and to promote cultural coherence 
among EU member states, it is recommended that career tracks be established that 
incorporate interdepartmental and conflict-related skills; facilitate internationalization of 
personnel in relevant ministries and state entities. These career tracks could further 
encourage universities to establish international conflict-oriented education options for 
civil servants and experts with relevant domestic experience; support EU development of 
inter-departmental expertise in the security-sector reform, including police, justice, and 
prison reform; recognize the additional (administrative) costs; enhance work on the 
                                                 
205 Compare, i.e., Varwick, Euroarmee, 48. Already then, a common European Ministry of Defense 
was considered. 
206 Caforio, Sociology, 31. 
207 See Rat der Europäischen Union. Jahresbericht des Rates an das Europäische Parlament über die 
Hauptaspekte und grundlegenden Optionen der GASP. Brussels, 2009, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/DE_PESC%202008_int.pdf. (accessed June 13, 2010). 
208 The objective of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) is to enhance the EU’s 
security culture. The virtual college is organized as a network of EU member states’ national institutes, 
academies, colleges, and institutions which deal with security and defense policy issues. The ESDC is 
intended to foster joint EU training in the area of CFSP and CSDP. 
209 The somewhat dull role of ERGOMAS has been addressed earlier in this study. 
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development of a set of guidelines to regulate relations between civil and military 
entities; and encourage and promote further research and debate among the general 
public, parliamentarians, and international partners.210 
An approach to further research could be to investigate in more depth to what 
extent cultural intersections have developed differently among EU member states and 
their military forces. At the EU level, those intersections would also have to be addressed 
in a comprehensive civil-military approach. 
Civil-military relations within ESDP implicitly assume certain pre-prepositions 
and perceptions. Good civil-military relations should not be taken for granted. Different 
national perceptions of security challenges have been a significant obstacle in developing 
comprehensive common EU policies.211 However, a common European approach for 
security requires a common European comprehension of security. This development of a 
comprehensive and common civil-military perception within the EU is “a bottom-up 
process that requires the alignment of member states´ conceptions”212 (if there are any), 
thereby contributing to a common European strategic culture, an ambition implicitly set 
by the European Security Strategy (ESS). 
If it was correct that “defence is not like other policy sectors”213 and that, 
“because of its political sensitivity, governments will not entrust responsibility for either 
making or implementing decisions to others,”214 then the achievements within the 
framework of ESDP as well as the various number of missions and operations can be 
called impressive, given especially the institutional constraints under which ESDP 
operates.215 However, it could then accordingly be argued that national characteristics in 
the realm of civil-military relations had and continue to have an inhibiting impact also on 
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civil-military relations within the realm of ESDP/CSDP, as has been investigated in this 
thesis with a brief view to the “big three,” France, the United Kingdom, and Germany. 
Constraints at the domestic level limit the evolutionary scope of civil-military culture at 
the EU level. The conceptual and connotative restriction of civil-military relations within 
the European Union might affect the EU’s overall democratic legitimacy. 
The successful integration of the Bundeswehr and that of a large number of 
former soldiers of the Nationale Volksarmee into the Bundeswehr after the reunification 
of Germany in 1990 adds to this logic. Despite national differences between EU member 
states’ civil-military relations, it is suggested that the EU as a whole can draw upon 
Germany´s “lessons” in order to shape a common and comprehensive EU civil-military 
concept.216 Germany, because of its foreign policy paradigm of multinationality, 
participates in almost every multinational military formation within the EU. 
The aim of this thesis is not to identify possible solutions to the problem but to 
stimulate discussion on the matter. It looks at a field of ESDP/ CSDP from a different 
angle, not investigating the usual—functional—fields of ESDP/ CSDP: origins, 
institutions, operations and missions, and capabilities. 
This author agrees to arguments that note the need for an intense debate over the 
necessity for Innere Fuehrung to regain strength in its entirety as opposed to its mere 
institutional appearance.217 He also agrees on that this matter, which is argued to have 
evolved due to the increasing focus on purely functional aspects in the line of this thesis´ 
train of thought, has to be taken on by political as well as military elites.218 However, the 
opinion that a decision about the preservation of the conscription system in Germany219 
is linked solely to security policy aspects and budgetary needs is not shared by this 
author. Although, one can agree to the conclusion that in light of the institutional set-ups 
and evolution of the Bundeswehr in its entirety over the past 55 years, the two key 
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original aims, (a) to prevent political misuse of orders and (b) to inhibit the armed forces 
from becoming a “state within the state,” have been achieved. In conjunction with the 
explanations in this study about the sociological dimension of civil-military relations, one 
can note an inverse drift of the parent societies away from its armed forces, which, it is 
argued here, is likely to become stronger with the end of conscription.220 At the domestic 
level, former Federal President Horst Koehler has described this phenomenon as 
“freundliches Desinteresse”221 (friendly indifference). 
At the EU level, this trend has not been noted at all. But from what has been 
argued in this thesis, it might be even more problematic in light of a future European 
Army. If created, it would have yet to be related (not only communicated) in its entirety 
to the EU population as a whole. 
The central role of man in the complex arrangement of EU’s military seems to be 
undervalued. It is the belief of this author, that the idea of congruency of a civil society 
and its armed forces through the principle of citizen in uniform should remain the focal 
point within a holistic approach towards comprehensive EU security and defense. Being a 
likewise unique historical situation, and even if with a different starting position, the EU 
could, with regard to the EU´s vision, benefit from the experience and lessons of 
Germany and Innere Fuehrung, which has clearly proven to be robust through times of 
significant systemic and domestic challenges and has been most progressive in including 
its armed forces into multinational structures. With approximately two million soldiers, 
Europeans should be able and willing to integrate and combine their national experiences 
in view of a “European citizen in uniform.”222 
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